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A LOGICO-ALGEBRAIC APPROACH TO THE MODEL 
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M.A. NAIT ABDALLAH 
Department of Computer Science, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada 
Abstract. In this paper we combine concepts from algebraic semantics and first-order logic 
programming in order to build an extended logic programming framework. This framework is 
applied to obtain a computational formalization of the model theory of knowledge of McCarthy 
et al. (1978). 
1. Introduction 
The “locality of definition” problem is defined by Bowen and Kowalski [2] as 
the possibility to use, in a given clause, 
P(X) + Local(S, 4(x, Y, z)) A r(x, Y, z) 
(p(x) holds if Local(& q(x, y, z)) holds and r-(x, y, z) holds), in the solution of 
subgoal q(x, y, z), some local information (contained in the auxiliary file 5) specific 
to this subgoal, in addition to the information contained in the general context 
where p(x) is to be solved. 
In [lo] the notion of an ion was introduced in ord‘er to solve this problem, and 
some algebraic semantics techniques were used to this end. The two basic features 
of [lo] are ions and parameterless logic program schemes. Ions are pairs of the form 
(P, g), whose intuitive meaning is “solve goal g in the context of logic program P”. 
Parameterless logic program schemes are pairs (E, P), where P is a logic program, 
and 2 is a system of equations & = Qi, i = 1, . . . , n, where 5 are procedure variables 
and Qi are programs. It turns out that the solution of 2 is given by the vector of 
(sets of) programs L(X, 5) = least_jixpoint(J?), where J? is the Scott-continuous 
operator associated with 1 [lo]. A T operator is then canonically associated to the 
scheme (E, P) by T(Z, P) = T([L(Z, g)/&]P) and it is shown that the denotational 
semantics of (1, P) coincides with its operational semantics. The two main features 
of the operational semantics of (2, P) are procedure calls (i.e. pulling out from the 
“library” 1 the information attached to a particular “file” [,), and ion rewriting 
steps (i.e. using the local definition feature described above). 
This then solves the “locality of definition” problem defined by Bowen and 
Kowalski [2] without calling upon language and metalanguage amalgamation. 
Problems occur, however, where some kind of “local information” is present, but 
which cannot be dealt with in the framework of [ lo]. Consider the following example 
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taken from the model theory of knowledge of McCarthy et al. [9]: “A king wishing 
to test the wisdom of his three wise men, puts a hat (either white or black) on the 
head of each one of them, and tells them that at least one hat is white. Each wise 
man can see the other two hats, but not his own. The king then successively asks 
each one of them whether he knows the color of his own hat.” 
An essential feature of this problem is that the three wise men share some 
information but not all the information. Let us assume that all three hats are white. 
Then the first wise man A, seeing two white hats, is unable to decide whether his 
own hat is black or white. The second wise man B also sees two white hats. He 
also knows that the first wise man A does not know the color of his hat (A’s hat). 
From this he concludes that the first wise man A may have seen either two white 
hats, or a white hat and a black hat; these are the only cases where the first wise 
man would be unable to infer the color of his own hat. These two cases, however, 
are equally probable, and the second wise man B will be unable to infer the color 
of his own hat, and will answer “I don’t know.” The third wise man C sees two 
white hats. He argues as follows. He knows that the first wise man answered “I 
don’t know.“, from which he can deduce, as the second wise man did, that the first 
wise man either saw two white hats, or a white hat and a black hat. Thus the third 
man’s own hat may be either white or black. If it were black, then the first wise 
man would have given the same answer, but the second wise man upon seeing a 
white and a black one would have answered that he had a white hat, which he did 
not. So the second wise man could not possibly have seen a white hat and a black 
hat. Thus he must have seen two white hats, and the third wise man answers that 
his hat is white. 
We would like to code this problem into Horn-clause programming, and then 
solve it by using SLD-derivation. We shall associate to each wise man a set of 
Horn-clauses, i.e. a procedure in the sense of [ 10, 121. This is not enough, however, 
because the wise men need to simulate each other’s reasoning. As an example, the 
second wise man knows that the first wise man gave the answer “I don’t know”, 
and he is able to reconstruct “in his own words” an approximation of the derivation 
made by the jirst wise man. (It is only an approximation, because he does not see 
the same things as the first wise man.) These facts need to be coded. In terms of 
logic programming, this means that whenever a procedure is called, it is given at 
the same time a query to be solved (here the statement “I don’t know”), i.e. 
invocations to procedures always have the form (5, g) (intuitively: “wise man < says 
g”), where 5 is the name of the set of clauses called upon, and g is the goal to be 
solved in the context of {. The pairs (5, g), called ions or L-terms in our terminology, 
will be used to express the fact that say, the second wise man knows the answer of 
the first wise man, “I don’t know”, which will be expressed by (6, idontknow), where 
i stands for the first wise man. The introduction of such ions takes us immediately 
outside of the realm of first-order Horn-clause programming into some kind of 
modal logic. These ions are not inside the framework of [lo, 11,121. Unless one 
introduces a complex coding of the above puzzle in terms of lists (goedelization) it 
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is not possible to solve the three wise men puzzle in the framework of classical 
logical programming. Computing with ions (reconstruction of approximations of 
derivations in our example) requires a modification of the usual SLD-derivation 
scheme. 
Thus we see here an occurrence of “the need for an ability to explicitly refer 
to theories (i.e. collection of clauses) and to discuss derivability from these theories” 
already considered in [2]. The “amalgamation logic” defined in [2], however, has 
not been given any firm mathematical foundations, and if taken literally, yields a 
programming language with no clear semantics. In “amalgamation logic” a formula 
P(i) is named by a term “P(i)” [2, pp. 155-1561 which stands for the tree in Fig. 
1, where ‘x (quote x) denotes the name of object x. 
/ \ 
‘P . 
/ \ 
‘i nil 
Fig. 1. Tree naming atomic formula P(i) in the metalanguage. 
However, in the formula [2, p. 1621 
Pr t, VnVA’(Member(“P(O)“, A’) A Vi(is n + Member(“P(i)+ P(i+ l)“, A’) 
+ Demo(A’, “P(n + l)“)), 
which formalizes mathematical induction, since “what is required is an expression 
which denotes a name for the formula obtained from P(i) by replacing all occur- 
rences of i by whatever term i is bound to in the larger context” [2, footnote p. 1621, 
in other words since the authors want to allow access to quoted variables, the term 
/ \ / \ 
‘P ’ is replaced by ‘P . 
/ \ / \ 
‘i nil i nil 
with no further explanation. Kowalski [8, pp. 141-1421 points out the sloppiness of 
that solution: “To convert names of results into results, combining metalevel with 
object level within the same expression, we need to include a naming predicate in 
the combined language: name(x, y) holds when y names x.. . It should be noted 
however, that the footnote on page 162 of [2] is incorrect as it fails to deal with the 
need for such a naming predicate.” 
The existence of such a naming predicate challenges the following claims of [2]. 
“The only restriction on the (object language) L and the (metalanguage) A4 imposed 
by the amalgamation is that the metalanguage A4 be adequate for the representation 
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of the provability relation of L. Horn clause logic is more than adequate as such a 
metalanguage. However, in the sequel we do not restrict the metalanguage M to 
Horn clause logic. Notice, moreover, that the amalgamation allows the case L = M, 
where the two languages are identical. This case is of special importance, as it allows 
the formulation both of sentences which mix object language and metalanguage 
and of self-referential sentences.” [2, p. 1641. “Moreover, negation can be interpreted 
either as standard classical negation, or as ‘negation by failure’. In the latter case 
we can always re-interpret it as classical negation by using Clark’s results (1978).” 
[p. 168-1691. As the reference to Clark [4] indicates, the explicit assumption 
throughout [2] is that the usual theory for Horn-clause programs generalizes verbatim 
to logic programs in the amalgamation universe. “We will carry out this amalgama- 
tion in such a way as to preserve the standard semantics of logic.” [2, p. 1541. “The 
amalgamation of L and M is a conservative extension in the sense that no new 
theorems are provable in the amalgamation that were not already provable either 
in L or M. In fact every proof in the amalgamation can be transformed into a 
normal proof in L or M by eliminating application of the linking rules.” [2, p. 1641. 
“Amalgamation logic inherits both the semantics and proof theory of classical 
first-order logic.” [2, p. 1681. This set of claims is clearly inconsistent. Indeed, we 
get the following (syntactically correct in the sense of [2]) paradoxical “amalgama- 
tion logic” program, and refutation, which is another formulation of the antinomy 
of the liar [14]. 
(1) lp + name( d, p) 
(2) name(d, narne(d, p) + lp) + 
(3) t l( name( d, p) + lp) 
(4) t name( d, nume( d, p) + lp) (3), (1) Modus Tollens 
(5) 0 (4), (2) Modus Tollens. 
Also, if we consider the “amalgamation logic” program 
(1) name(d(p),~)+lp 
(2) name(d(p), name(db), P) CT) + 
(3) N(a) +- 
(4) M(b) + 
(5) xc nume( u, x) A nume(u, y) A y 
where x and y in the last clause denote propositional variables, then atom N(b) is 
the root of an infinite derivation 
N(b) kN(b) GN(b) ;. . 
and thus the program has no model in the usual sense, as predicate N has no clear 
value for argument b. 
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Thus we shall develop here the programme started in [lo], and we now describe 
the extension to [lo] which is needed for handling the new objects (5, g) described 
earlier in this introduction. 
2. Logic program schemes with ions, syntax 
2.1. Types and alphabets 
Our general framework will be a slightly modified version of Church type theory 
[3]. We shall, however, restrict ourselves to a rather small subset of second-order 
logic. We first recall a few definitions and conventions. 
The hierarchy of types we shall use will have four basic types: L, n, o and 7. 
Types L and r are not comparable, and are both subtypes of type o. Each symbol 
will have at least one type. The class of type symbols is recursively defined as follows: 
(i) L, m, o and 17 are type symbols. 
(ii) If (Y and p are type symbols, then so is (a + p). 
(iii) Type symbols are defined only in this way. 
In the interpretation of the theory, it is intended that L be the type of logic program 
queries (i.e. ions), v the type of logic programs, o the type of all propositions (thus 
comprehending both r and L), and 7 the type of individuals. Symbol ((Y + p) is 
intended to be the type of functions of one variable for which the range of the 
independent variable comprises the type (Y and the range of the dependent variable 
is contained in the type p. 
Functions of several variables are explained, following Schijnfinkel, as functions 
of one variable whose values are functions, and propositional functions are simply 
regarded as functions whose values are propositions. Thus, e.g., (7 + (7 + 0)) is the 
type of propositional functions of two individual variables. We introduce the 
following notational conventions. A type symbol of the form ((Ye + 
(. . .+ (a, + p)). . .) will be denoted ((Ye,. . , a, + /3), thus clearly separating the 
type list of the arguments (Y, , . . . , a,, from the type of the result /3. Another notation 
we will use for the same type symbol is ((Y + p), where LY = (cy, , . . . , a,) is the vector 
of types of the arguments. If (Y and p are two vector of type symbols, we denote 
by (cy, p) the vector of types obtained by taking ((Y, p + a), where (Y, /3 is the list 
of type symbols obtained by taking the concatenation of (Y and p in that order. 
Our language will use the following primitive symbols (the types are displayed as 
subscripts): 
(i) a set V= {x, y, z, . . .} of typed variables. From this set we distinguish the 
following four subsets: 
l a first subset 1I’ G V ofjirst-order relation symbols 9 = {de, ,ya, . . .} where (Y denotes 
any type symbol of the form (7,. . . , 77 + L); 
l a second subset @G V of variable function symbols denoting functions of any 
arity strictly greater than 0 from individuals to individuals; thus elements of @ 
will have types of the form (7, . . . ,v + 7); 
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l a third subset E c V of higher-order variable symbols (procedure variables) where 
each symbol 5 E Z simultaneously has several types, one type being the “proposi- 
tional” type o, and one or more types being of the form (a, p + r) = (a; /3) where 
either one of the vector of type symbols (Y and /? may be empty; 
l and a fourth subset V, containing all variables of type r] (individual variables). 
The elements of V, are, in fact, the 0-ary variable symbols. 
(ii) a set of constants R u F u Con which is decomposed as follows: 
l a set R of first-order constant relation symbols. 
l a set F of function constant symbols F = {fa, g,, . . .} denoting functions of any 
arity from individuals to individuals. 
l a set I = {i,, j,, . . .}, where (Y = (rr, L + L), of ionic operator symbols. 
l a set of connectives 
Con = {V,, 3,: LY is a type symbol of the form (/3 + y) or (p, o + 0)) 
u { +(‘,‘-‘)> 1(‘4> u 1 A e: Q = ( 77, 77 + n-) or (Y = (L, L + L)}. 
(iii) metasymbols: A, (, ). 
2.2. z--terms and L-terms 
2.2.1. Basic definitions 
In Church type theory [3] well-formedformulae (wffs) and their types are defined 
as follows. 
(i) A variable or constant alone is a wff and has the type of the symbol it consists 
of. 
(ii) If M and N are wffs of type (a + p) and (Y respectively, then (MN) is a 
wff of type p. 
(iii) If M is a wff of type p, and x is a variable of type (Y, then ( AxM) is a wff 
of type (a-+p). 
We now define a subclass of wffs which will be used in order to define the syntax 
of our logic programs. This class of wffs will contain three kinds of objects: first, 
the n-terms, which represent terms of individuals and correspond to the usual notion 
of a term in predicate languages; second, the r-terms, which basically represent 
terms of logic programs; and third, the L-terms, which represent terms of ions (i.e. 
more or less logic program goals). 
An q-term (also sometimes simply called a term) is an individual variable, an 
individual constant or has the form fa (t, , . . . , t,) where fu is a function symbol E F u 
@ of type (Y, t,, . . . , t, are n-terms, and (Y = (7,. . . , 7 + 7) is a type symbol with 
n + 1 occurrences of symbol 7. 
We now define atomic formulae. We have two kinds of atomic formulae, atoms 
and procedure calls. 
Atoms are defined as follows: 
(i) if r E R u ?I’ has type (7, . _ . , 77 + o) where n occurs n times, and 
(ii) t,, . . . , t, are q-terms, 
then r(t,,... , t,) is an atom. 
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Procedure calls are defined as follows: 
(i) if 5 E E has type (CX; p), where (Y has length m, and /3 has length n, and 
(ii) if r,, . . . , r,,,, and sI, . . . , s, are elements of R u Tf such that type(ri) = a, for 
i=l,..., m and types( si) = pi for i = 1, . . . , n and if each well-formed formula 
of the list p consists of one single symbol, 
then [(r*, . . . , r,; s,, . . . , s,) is a procedure call. 
Dejinite clauses are defined as follows: if A, B,, . . . , B, are L-terms with m B 0 
thenA+B,~... A B, is a definite clause. 
A rr-term is a wff of type rr which is defined as a finite conjunction of definite 
clauses and procedure calls. We denote by n( Z, 2, R u T, F u @ u V,,) the set of 
all n-terms constructed with symbols from Z, E, R u q, and F u @ and V,. 
A L-term is a wfi of type L defined as follows: 
(i) Every atom is a L-term. 
(ii) If p is a n-term, and g,, . . . , g, are L-terms, and if L is a ionic operator 
symbol, then i( p, g, A . . . A gn) also denoted by (p, g, A. . . A g,),, is a L-term. 
In such a L-term, p is the n-component, and the set {g,, . . . , gm} is the 
L-component of the c-term. 
We denote by .9( I, 9 R u !P, F u @u V,,) the set of all L-terms constructed with 
symbols from 1, F, Ru !P, and Fu@ and V,,. 
Let QEU(S, R u !P, F u @ u V,,) be a r-term. We now define the set of exported 
variables and the set of imported variables of Q. The definition is as follows. 
V,(Q) = {x E V,: x occurs in Q}, 
Q(Q) = {c$ E @: 4 occurs in Q}, 
!P( Q) = {x E !P: x occurs in Q}, 
Exportable(Q) = { 4 E q(Q) u CD(Q) u V,(Q): C#J occurs at least once in the 
head symbol of the atom A of some clause A + B, A . . . A 
B, of Q, or as a member of the list /3 of some call [((u; p) 
occurring in Q}, 
lmportabZe( Q) = V,(Q) u @(Q) u Q(Q). 
By definition an abstracted rr-berm, is a wff of the form Vqp3x.Q such that 
(i) Q~17(1, S, Ru~,Fu@uV,,), 
(4 (qux)n(@u ~Y)=dQ)u WQL 
(iii) Q, c Importable(Q) and x G Exportable(Q). 
If p is of type a and x is of type p, the abstracted n-term Vq3x.Q is of type 
(a, P + r) = (a; P). 
Thus, intuitively, an abstracted r-term is a wff where all the relation and function 
variables are bound. If Vq3x.Q is an abstracted r-term, then the variables of Q 
bound by the prefix t1+03x are by definition the algebraic variables of Q. The other 
variables, which will be implicitly universally quantified at the level of definite 
clauses, will be the logical variables of Q. 
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Notice that the connective 3, (also denoted by 3x,) should not be interpreted 
as in Church theory (i.e. lVx,l). Rather, it should be seen as a constructive 
mechanism that allows a given logic program to export information to the outside 
world [ 111. This will be developed further on in the paper. 
Notice that the intuitive notion of a logic program (set of clauses) corresponds 
to the forma1 notion of a rr-term. For example, logic program 
sum(O, x, x) + 
sum(s(x), y, s(z)) + sum(x, y, z) 
which is in fact 
Vx(sum(0, x, x) t tt) 
Vxyz(sum(s(x), Y, s(z)) + sum(x, Y, z)) 
corresponds to the n-term 
Vx(sum(0, x, x) + tt) A Vxyz(sum(s(x), y, s(z)) + sum(x, y, z)) 
displayed in tree-like form in Fig. 2. 
Thus r-terms are a special kind of wffs, which may be treated as trees. The same 
remark can be made about L-terms. To simplify the terminology, these two kinds 
of terms will be sometimes referred to as rl-trees, or simply trees, in the rest of our 
discussion. 
2.2.2. Contexts and occurrences 
Occurrences in trees are defined as usual. If t is a tree, we shall denote by O(t) 
its set of occurrences. If t is a tree, and p is an occurrence of t, we denote by (tJp) 
the subtree of occurrence p in a. The type of an occurrence Al. E O(t) will be the type 
of the subtree occurring at p in t. 
/ 
A 
\ 
vx vx 
c VY 
/ \ I 
sum tt vz 
/I\ I 
sum sum 
/I\ /I\ 
s Y s x Y z 
I I 
X Z 
Fig. 2. Example of a r-term. 
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Of special interest are the occurrences p of type L in b-terms which we call 
canonical occurrences, and which will be used for SLD-resolution steps. They are 
defined as follows. Let t be a L-term. Then an occurrence P E O(t) is a canonical 
occurrence if and only if 
(i) either t is an atom, 
(ii) or t is a L-term of the form t = i( p, g, A * **11g,),and~=2s~‘,wherel<s~m, 
and CL’ is a canonical occurrence in L-term g,. 
Intuitively, canonical occurrences of type L are exactly those occurrences upon 
which using SLD-resolution steps will be performed. 
Since for canonical occurrences, in an “ionic operator branching”, we always 
pickup the L-component part, the 2’s occurring in a canonical occurrence may be 
omitted, thus keeping only the more terse path from the “outside shell” of the L-term 
through the nesting of its L-subcomponents. A canonical occurrence is then simply 
a sequence which is either of the form ~Q,E N” in the case we have an atom, or has 
the form i,n,iznz.. . iknkpo, where the i’s are ionic operators, the n’s are strictly 
positive natural numbers, and P,,E N*. In particular, any canonical occurrence of 
type L is either empty, or has the form i,n,i2n2.. . iknk, where the i’s are ionic 
operators, and the n’s are strictly positive natural numbers. 
A r-context is a r-term where some occurrence of type rr has been substituted 
by the r-hole [ I=. Similarly, a L-context is a L-term where some occurrence of type 
L has been substituted by the L-hole [ ]‘.I Now, a CT-context is a L-term where some 
occurrence of type rr has been substituted by the n-hole [ I,. A TL-context is a 
r-term where some occurrence of type L has been substituted by the L-hole [ 1‘. 
Finally, an abstracted rr-context is an abstracted n-term where some occurrence of 
type n has been replaced by the r-hole [ I,. 
Occurrences in contexts are defined in a similar way. All we have to do is to 
consider the hole [ ] as being a special kind of primitive symbol. 
A canonical context is a L-context c[ 1‘ where the occurrence of the L-hole [ IL 
is canonical. 
If c[ ] is a context and a is a tree with the same type as the hole of c[ 1, we 
define the tree c[a] as being the context c[ ] in which the hole [ ] has been filled 
by tree a. 
A L-term is said to be ground iff 
(i) each atom having a canonical occurrence in that L-term is variable-free, and 
(ii) no procedure variable [E E or relation variable I/I E tY or function variable 
cp E @ occurs free in the L-term. 
For a rr-term P, we define the ionic base I,(P) of P as being the set of all ground 
L-terms that can be constructed from symbols of P. An ionic interpretation of program 
P is defined as a subset of its ionic base. A L-term a is elementary if and only if its 
’ Notice that this definition is not a formal one. What contexts really provide is a notion of syntactic 
metavariable, so that a given occurrence of some variable may be replaced by something else without 
interfering with the other occurrences of the same variable. A more formal definition for contexts may 
be given by following the same definition scheme as the one we had for m-terms and L-terms. 
214 M.A. Nait Abdallah 
set of canonical occurrences is linearly ordered by the prefix ordering. A L-term a 
is elementary up to occurrence A if and only if each canonical occurrence of a is 
either a (left) prefix of A, or has A as a prefix. 
2.2.3. Ions, logic programs with ions and procedures 
The relation between logic programs and n-terms can be made more precise as 
follows. 
We define two mutually recursive equivalence relations =x on r-terms, and sL 
on L-terms, as being the coarsest partial equivalence relations over the set of all 
L-terms (for -,), and the set of all (possibly abstracted) r-terms (for iii), such that 
(0) p A p’ = ~ p’ A p for every n-terms p, p’, 
(i) tt A g =L g for every L-term g, 
(ii) g A tt EL g for every b-term g, 
(iii) VT-context c[ I,, VT-terms p, p’, we have p =,,p’+ c[p], =T c[p’],, 
(iv) VLr-context c[ ]_ VT-terms p, p’, we have p =,p’+ c[p]* =L c[p’],, 
(v) V7i-L-context c[ I,, VL-terms a, a’, we have a =‘a’+ ~[a], =r ~[a’],, 
(vi) VL-context c[ It, VL-terms a, a’, we have a ~~a’=+ ~[a], zL ~[a’]~. 
By definition an ion is an =,-equivalence class of L-terms. A logic program with 
ions is an =,-equivalence class of r-terms. A (generic) procedure is a =,-equivalence 
class of abstracted r-terms. The other definitions given for r-terms and b-terms are 
similarly extended to ions and logic programs with ions. 
More intuitively, the logic program corresponding to a given r-term is simply 
the set of (nontrivial) conjuncts of that n-term. The undefined r-term tt corresponds 
to the empty logic program 0 (empty set of conjuncts). Similarly, an ion is simply 
a b-term stripped of all its trivial tt conjuncts. 
Sometimes, when no ambiguity is likely to arise, we shall confuse between r-terms 
(resp. abstracted r-terms, resp. L-terms) and the associatded logic programs (resp. 
procedures, resp. ions). 
Thus a logic program may be seen as a set of definite clauses and procedure calls. 
In the ion (p, B, A . . . A B,)i, we say that the sequence of ions {B,, . . . , B,} is the 
ionic component of the ion, the logic program P is its program component, and 
i = Axy.(x, Y)~ is the ionic operator. An ion whose ionic component is empty is called 
an empty ion. 
Example. The following equation defines the abstract data type “queue”. Its right- 
hand side is a procedure. 
queue = Vis_item _ 3is_queue e add de1 front is-empty. 
{ is_queue( e) +- 
is_empty( e) + 
is_queue(add( i, X)) + is-queue(X) A is_item( i) 
del(add(i, e), e)t is-item(i) 
del(add(i, X), add(i, Y))+ is-item(i) A del(X, Y) 
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fiont(add(e, i), i) + is-item(i) 
fiont(add(j, add(k, X)), i)+fiont(add(k, X), i) A is-queue(X) 
A is-item(i)} 
The operators i = hx,y,.(x, Y)~ defined above act much like the evaluation 
operator of pure h-calculus, or, if one prefers, of pure Lisp. The big difference is 
that now we have scope problems (i.e. which definite clauses are applicable), due 
to the nesting of ions, and to the fact that logic programs are sets of clauses. This 
manifests itself by the fact that several choices may be possible. The operator 
corresponding to the evul operator of pure Lisp is the Prolog interpreter itself, 
suitably modified for handling ions. 
In this paper, we shall only consider two kinds of ions in some detail (cf. Section 
4): open ions, denoted by (P, g),, which will be identified with those considered in 
[lo], and ions of the form (v(i, Z), g)2, where i is a natural number, 2 a logic 
program and g a conjunction of ions, which will be used in order to formalize 
computations in the theory of knowledge of [9]. 
2.3. Orderings on r-terms and L-terms 
We define the two mutually recursive orderings E, on r-terms, and c‘ on L-terms, 
as being the coarsest equivalence relations over the set of all x-terms (for G,), and 
the set of all L-terms (for c,), such that 
(i) tt c,p for every T-term p (thus tt is the smallest element of this ordering), 
(ii) VT-context c[ I,, VT-terms p, p’, we have p ~,p’+ c[p] C~ c[p’], 
(iii) VL7r-context c[ I,, VT-terms p, p’, we have p c,p’* c[p] C, c[p’], 
(iv) Vn-L-context c[ IL, VL-terms a, a’, we have a L‘ a’ =+ ~[a] c,, ~[a’], 
(v) V&-context c[ I,, VL-terms a, a’, we have a c, a’+ ~[a] C‘ ~[a’]. 
The smallest element tt (which, for reasons of convenience, shall also be denoted 
by 0) in our ordering of n-terms corresponds to the empty logic program, where 
every query fails. This seems reasonable since such a program defines the empty 
relation, which is the least defined relation in the sense of denotational semantics. 
Notice that the set II(I, E, R u W, F u @u V,) of all n-terms, when supplied 
with the above ordering c,, does not have a cpo structure. This is due to the fact 
that it does not contain all least upper bounds. The set ,a( i, E, R u ‘P, F u @ u V,,) 
of b-terms also lacks some least upper bounds, as well as a smallest element. 
2.4. Completion of the set of rr-terms and the set of L-terms for their partial orderings 
We use completion through ideals [l, 61. The set of r-terms is then made into a 
cpo. The set of b-terms is completed, but does not yield a cpo. This will give infinite 
trees corresponding to infinite r-terms and infinite L-terms. 
2.5. Substitutions 
We now define substitutions in TL-trees. These definitions simply generalize the 
classical definitions used in algebraic semantics and h-calculus. We simply need to 
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take into account the fact that our terms are typed, and a substitution takes place 
only if the type of the object to substitute and the type of the object being substituted 
match. 
l Let t be a given tree, n be a variable, and let O(v, t) be the set of occurrences 
of z, in that tree. We denote by [ t’/v]t the tree obtained by replacing every 
occurrence of ZI in t by t’. 
l Let f=(tr,..., t,) be a vector of trees, and ZI be a variable. Then, if t’ is a tree, 
we define 
[t’/v]t=([t’/v]t,,. ..,[f’/U]&). 
l Let P be a set of trees, 0( U, t) = {p,, . . . , pk} be the set of occurrences of variable 
v in tree t. We define 
rP/n]t = {[p,/p,, . . . , Pk/pklt: PI,. . . , Pk E p>. 
In the case where v does not occur in t, we generalize this to [ P/v]t = {t} for any 
P. In particular, in the case v E t and P = (d, we have [0/v] t = {t}. 
l Let f be a functional symbol of arity n, t a tree, and t’ a tree whose only freely 
occurring variables are u,, . . . , u,. Then the substituted tree [Au, . . . u,.t’/f]t is 
obtained by recursively replacing each occurrence off in t by the p-normal form 
of the tree 
(All,. . . u,.t’)([Au, . . . u,.t’/f]Jv) 
where N is given by (tip) =f(N) where P is the occurrence off in t being 
replaced. 
Substitutions on contexts are defined similarly. All we have to do is consider the 
“hole” as a special kind of constant that cannot be substituted. If c[ ] is a context 
and 0 is a substitution, we denote by ce[ ] the new context resulting from applying 
substitution B to c[ 1. 
Remark. As we shall see later in this paper, our basic notion of a program is that 
of a pair (2, P) where CZ is a rewriting system and P is a r-term. Although the 
above definitions for substitution are quite general, as far as our framework is 
concerned, however, substitution should be separated into two distinct notions: 
(i) Those substitutions that have to do with the rewriting system 2 (i.e. the 
algebraic aspect of our computations), and are used during procedure call 
rewriting steps (Section 4.2.1) and also in the fixpoint theory of 2; we may 
call those substitutions algebraic substitutions, and the variables they act upon 
algebraic variables. Variables substituted by such substitutions may be in any 
of E, @, P and V,,. 
(ii) Those substitutions that have to do with the logical aspect of our computations, 
and are used in SLD-resolution steps (which we also call simplification steps 
in Section 4.2.2) and the fixpoint theory of operator T. We may call such 
substitutions logical substitutions, and the variables they act upon logical 
variables. Variables substituted by such substitutions have to be in V,. 
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2.6. Direct approximations 
The direct approximant w(t) of given T-term (or L-term) t is obtained by substitut- 
ing every procedure call occurring in t by the undefined r-term 0 = tt. For example 
the following terms 
5 
(cc a A i(S, b)), 
(c+ a A i((b + i(k d)), b)), 
(c + a A i((b + i((d +- ), 4), b)), 
have as direct approximants respectively 
fl, 
(c + a A i(0, b)), 
(C+Q A i((bti(f2, d)), b)), 
(c + a A i((b + i((d +- ), d)), b)), 
2.7. Unsjkation of h-terms 
We shall now extend the usual notion of unification in first-order logic to L-terms 
as follows. Let i( K, a) and j(H, c) be two b-terms, where a and c each consist of 
a single conjunct. By definition, we shall say that these two L-terms unify if and 
only if all of the following three properties hold: 
(i) H =?r K, 
(ii) i =j, 
(iii) c and a unify. 
Notice that the recursion contained in this definition always terminates, and that 
=,-equality is decidable. In the case the two L-terms i( K, a) and j( Zf, c) unify, by 
definition any unifier of a and c is also a unifier of i( K, a) and j(H, c). 
3. Algebraic semantics of rewriting systems 
We now generalize to this ionic setting the definitions given in [6, lo] for rewriting 
systems and logic program schemes. A rewriting system over II( I, 5, R LJ P, F u CD u 
V,) is a system 2 of n equations 
where 
0 tie.?, for i=l,..., n, is a procedure name, 
l tl~i3~i.Ti={tl~i.3~i.Q:Q~~i}, where ~ic17(1,~,Ru~i,Fu~juV,) are 
subsets whose elements are z--terms, where Qi = @n (pi ux,), and Wi = W n 
(Cpi U Xi)* 
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For each logic program Q E I7, vi is a set of variables imported by Q, and xi is 
a set of variables exported by Q for i = 1,. . . , n. We denote by t the vector of subsets 
(T,, . . . , Tl). 
From the point of view of rewriting system 2, only those variables occurring in 
the prefixes Vqi3xi of the equations & = V+O~EIX~ T, are active. All the other variables 
are for the time being universally quantified, and can be substituted only when 
performing SLD-derivation steps. Those variables occurring in the lists vi and xi 
are our algebraic variables, whereas the other ones are the logical variables. Thus 
algebraic variables are quantified at the r-term level, whereas the logical variables 
are quantified at the definite clause level. 
Given a system of equations such as the above, we consider the following set of 
vectors of subsets of abstracted n-terms. 
% = {(Au,.q,, . . . , h4n): 9, c n(A E, RUT,,, Fu@~u I’,,)} 
where we shall use the (slightly abusive) notation Aui.Qi, where ui = (vi, xi), as an 
abbreviation for the abstracted n-term Vqi3xiQi. Thus, in our approach, we use 
a substitutional interpretation Aui of the quantification Vpi3xi. Also a set of 
abstracted r-terms with all the same prefix {Au,.Q : Qi E ql} will be denoted by hukqi, 
i.e. the set of (non-abstracted) r-terms q1 supplied with that prefix. Set ie is 
canonically ordered componentwise by the subset ordering, and forms a complete 
lattice. 
Following [6] we associate to E a self-map $ defined on % as follows: 
2 : q-[(Au,.q,, . . . , &.qn)/(5,, . . > 5n>lt 
or, using a shorter notation, q++[Au.q/5]t. 
Lemma 3.1. 2 is monotone increasing and Scott-continuous. 
Proof. The proof is obvious and simply uses the definition of the substitution 
operation. 0 
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, this lemma implies that J? has a least fixpoint, 
lfp(e), since % is a complete lattice. 
Lemma 3.2. Let T(q) =2(q) u q, alzd z*(q) = UntN l?‘(q). Then, Vt, t’ we have 
t :t’ =3 [Au.q/&]t’z [Au._f*(q)/&]t. 
Proof. It is enough to show that 
vt, t’ t St’ + [Au.q/&]t’c [Au.-f*(q)/g]t. 
Let m be the occurrence in t rewritten by step t +’ t’, i.e. (tim) = &(t,,,) and 
t’=[[t,,,/ui]ti/m]t where tiE Ti. Let us define [tm/ui]ti = t”. Now we have 
LAWSIt’= [[h~.~/51~“/~1~~~.~/51~~/~1~ 
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and also 
~~~~~:(~~/5lt~~~hU~4/515i~~~~lWI~AU~~~4~/51~Wlmlf~ 
By monotonicity of the substitution operation, it is enough to show that 
[Au.qlSlf’= [A~.-f:(d/51~,@m). 
The proof of this fact is as follows: 
[Au.q/51tf’=[AU.q/51[~~/~iIt, E [Au.q/SI[tm/UiIT, 
= [[AU.Q/SIfm/uiI[hu.q/5IT, = [[Au*q/SItm/uiI~(q)t 
G [[AU.q/5IL/SIJ:(q)i G [[hu.~(q)/5Ir,/sI~(q)i 
=(AU~~(q)i)([A~.~.(q)/5Itrn)=(AU.~(q))i([h1(.~(4)/5It,) 
= ([Au.~‘(q)/515i)([Au.~:(q)l~lt,) = [Au.-%d/515,(L). 
Whence the lemma. 0 
Lemma 3.3. For any v-terms t and t’ such that t E Il( I, E, R u ?P, F u Qi u V,,), and 
t’E[Au.L/g]t we have that t +=* t’, where L=(L(& [,(u,)), . . . , L(E, &)(u,))). 
Proof. The proof is made by induction on the depth of tree t. q 
Lemma 3.4. L=(L(E, t,(uI)), . . . , L(2, &(u,))) is ajxpoint ofi. 
Proof. (i) We first show that e(L)& L. e(L) =[Au.L/glT~t’ implies, by Lemma 
3.3, that for some TV T, we have t +=* t’. Now 
,. 
t; E E(L)i =a 3t E Tit ‘,* t’. 
We also have &(u;) + t + t’; therefore, t’E Li = L(E, t,(q)). 
(ii) We now show that Lc$(L). This is shown by using Lemma 3.2 with t, t’ 
such that t +z* t’, t E Ti, t’E L;, and q = L. Hence 
t’E[AU.L/~]tC[AU~q/~]‘&=~(L)ip 
i.e. t’EJ?(L)i. Therefore, Vt’E Li, we have t’EJ?(L);, whence Like,, i.e. LG 
2 (L) by quantifying over the i’s. (Notice that in this proof we have used the notation 
Li = L(x~ b(S))-) 0 
Lemma 3.5. Ls lfp(e). 
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.2 with t = &(ui), t’E {Aui.pi: pi E 17(1,0, R u !Pi, 
F u ai, V,)}, q = 0. We then obtain 
b(S) = t Yt’+ [AuJ*(S)/&]~~(U~) = lfp($)i 
R II 
b’E L, ([h~.~*(0)/515(u))=lfP(e)i 
i.e., Vi, we have that t’E L,+t’E lfp(e)i, i.e. Lc lfp($). 0 
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Now putting together Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5, we get the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.6. L = lfp(2). 
4. Logic program schemes for the model theory of knowledge, and their interpretation 
A scheme on (I, E, R LJ 9, F u @ u V,,) is a system of n equations 
2: & = kf+~Jx~Q~ 
wherefori=l,...,n,&E E are procedure names and Qi E II( I, E, R u !tfi, F u Qi u 
V,) are T-terms, where @, and 1vi are defined as for rewriting systems. To each 
such scheme we associate a rewriting system: 
where i=l,..., n, which will be called _&. 
A logic program scheme (or LPS) is a pair (2, P), where .E is a scheme and P is 
a r-term (logic program) in n( Z, E, R u !P, F u @u V,). 
We define a E-redex as being any occurrence of a procedure call [,;(a; p). An 
w-step is obtained by replacing any given occurrence of some procedure call by the 
undefined r-term tt = fi (i.e. logic program 0). 
Example 1. Let 2 be the scheme defined by the single equation 
5 = Vx.{a(x) + i(t(h(x)), b(x)) A c(x)). 
Then we have, for instance, the following derivation: 
5(l)+{a(L)+ i(Hh(l))> b(l))~ c(l)) 
-{a(l)+ i({a(h(l))+ i(t(h(h(l))), b(h(l))) A c(h(l))I, b(l)) A c(l)1 
Example 2. Consider the following scheme 2: 
u = VXV y. 
{h(r) + 
a(x) + b 
5(x) + 
1 
5 = Vz.{b + (dstx), Y), d)l. 
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Then using both E-steps and w-steps, we get the following derivation: 
~vdr)+ ; u(i) + b ; b + (4.44 ~1, d)) 
:{h(y)+ ; a(i)+ b; 
b + ({h(r) + ; a( + b ; 5(49)), d)l 
s{h(y)+ ; u(i)+b; 
b + ({h(y) + ; a(s(i)) * b ; b + (ds’(i), ~1, d)l, d)l 
3h(Y) + ; a(i)+ b; 
b + ({h(y) + ; a(s(i)) + b ; b + (0, d)l, d)). 
In the above derivation we have two kinds of steps: Z-steps and w-steps. A E-step 
takes a Zredex and applies a rewriting step to it. An w-step takes a I-redex and 
replaces it by the “undefined” r-term ft. 
One easily checks that the set of all r-terms obtained from a given n-term through 
E-steps and w-steps is directed for the ordering c~, and yields a (possibly infinite) 
n-term as a limit. 
The Herbrund semantics of recursive scheme (2, t) is given by the possibly infinite 
rr-term 
L(&, t) = { t’E II(Z, Q, R u ‘P, F u @u V,): t + t’}. 
4.1. Leustjixpoint semantics of logic program schemes 
The ionic base of a logic program scheme (2, P) is defined as being the ionic 
base of n--term L(&, P). A goal ion for LPS (2, P) is an expression of the form 
((-Y P), 4 A. ..r\B,)maO 
where B, , . . . , B, are ions with relation symbols from R and function symbols from 
F. The intuitive meaning of the goal ion is the same as the one of a goal clause in 
the usual case, namely that of a negation of the conjunction of ions it displays. 
In the rest of this paper, we shall restrict ourselves to the case where we only 
have two ionic operators: i, = hx,y,.(x, Y)~, which is the open ion construct discussed 
in [lo] and formalizes the notion of local definition, and i, = hx,y,.(x, Y)~, which 
we use in our formalization of the model theory of knowledge of [9]. More precisely, 
we use an abstracted r-term u = VN-y.Q to formalize reasoning agents, where i is 
an integer which identifies the agent, y represents the world where agent number i 
is reasoning, and r-term Q describes the “internal logic” of this agent. We use 
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m-term i,(a(k, y), p) (also denoted (a(k, y), p)J to express the fact that agent 
number k “knows” (i.e. is able to prove) p. Similarly, 
(41, r1), (42, Y2),7(a(3, YJ, P&)2 
stands for “Agent 1, reasoning in world y,, knows that agent 2, reasoning in world 
yz, knows that agent 3, reasoning in world yX does not know p.” 
We say that a canonical occurrence A in a L-term a is a-reducible iff 
(i) the L-term is elementary up to A, and 
(ii) A = i21p for some P, where ionic operator iO is the only ionic operator 
occurring in string CL. 
We say that a context C[ ] is r-free iff [ ] is of canonical occurrence A in C[ 1, 
and ionic operator i, has no occurrence in string A. 
Intuitively, clausal scopes determine which clauses are applicable to a given 
sub-b-term in order to solve it. More precisely, let A be a canonical occurrence in 
a L-term (or context) a. Then its scope scope(A, a) is defined as follows: 
(i) if A = e then scope(A, a) = 0; 
(ii) if A = i,n,i,n,. . . ik_,nk_,iknk and if we define A’= i,n,i2n2. _ . ik_,nk_,, then 
(a) if ik = Axy.(x, Y)~, and (a&A’) = (0, a, A. . . A a, A - * . A a,), with m = nk, 
then scope(A, a) = Qu scope(A’, a), 
(b) if ik = Axy.(x, y)z and (aiA’) = (0, a, A * . . A a, A. . . A q), with m = nk, 
and none of i,, . . . , ik_, is equal to Axy.(x, Y)~, then scope(A, a)= Q 
(notice that in this last case Q = ~(j, 2) for some natural number j and 
logic program Z). 
(iii) else scope(A, a) = 0. 
If (2, P) is a logic program scheme, then we associate with (2, P) a subset 
transformation which is generalized from the definition given in [5]. The definition 
of [5] is as follows. Let P be a (classical) logic program; with program P we associate 
subset transformation T(P) defined on the powerset P(H,,) of its Herbrand base 
(i.e. set of all variable-free atoms constructed from symbols from P) by 
SH{AI~: AB+&OA. . . A B,,,t? is a variable-free instance 
of a clause of P, and B,O, . . , B,O E S}. 
The generalization of T(P) we need here is defined as follows. Let P be a call-free 
program PE n({Axy.(x, Y)~, Axy.(x, y)*}, 0, R, F u V). Let I,(P) be the ionic base 
of P, i.e. the set of all ground ions that can be constructed from symbols of l? With 
program P we associate a subset transformation also denoted by T(P). As with 
ions, this transformation T(P) will be made out of two ingredients: a program 
component Tp, and several ionic components. The ionic components depend on 
the specific set of ionic present in the language Z = {Axy.(x, Y)~, Axy.(x, Y)~}. More 
precisely, each ionic operator Axy.(x, Y)~ will generate a transformation Tonic,,, 
describing the contribution of this operator to T(P). The first operator will only 
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contribute through its scope rule. The operator Axy.(x, Y)~ will contribute both 
through its scope rule, and the “other agent simulation process” outlined in the 
introduction. The set Elem of all empty ions, which in this setting corresponds to 
the logical constant true (or empty goal) of classical logic programs, plays a crucial 
role. Subset transformation T(P) is defined on the powerset 9(Z,(P)) of the ionic 
base by 
T(P): WMP))- ~,(ZtdP)L 
where 
Tonic.0 : S++{C[AO] ground ion :(A0 + B,B A. . . A B,O) is a ground 
instance of some rule A + B, A . . * A B, belonging to the 
scope scope([ 1, C[ I), C[ ] is a context, C[B,B], . . . , 
w,a E 9 
u Elem, 
7&c,2:S~{C[Af3] ground ion :(A~+B,OA~~~AB,~) is a ground 
instance of some rule A + B, A . . . A B, belonging to 
scope([ 1, C[ I), C[ ] is context, c[B,e], . . . , c[B,e]E S 
u {c[(di, X), (Q,, . . . , (Q,,. (dj, Y), gMo . . .hM ground 
ion: n 2 0, C[(a(j, Q1 u . . . u Qn), 
(Q, >. . .V (Qn, 8)&l.. .)J E S, where C[ ] is a a-free 
context, i #j, and X and Y are logic programs} 
u Elem, 
Tp : S++{C[AO] ground ion :(A0 + BIB A. . . A B,8) is a ground instance 
ofsomeruleAcB,~e. . A B, E P, C[ ] is a u-free context, 
c[B,e],...,c[B,e]d) 
where Elem is the set of all empty ions of the ionic base. (These are exactly the 
ground empty ions.) 
Foralogicprogramscheme(~,P),wedefineT(~,P)=T([L(~,,)/5]P)=T(P’), 
where P’ = [L(& g)/g]P The results given in [lo] generalize to the new transfor- 
mation. 
Theorem 4.1. The mapping T(P’) : ?7’( I,,( P’)) -+ 9(lb( P’)) is Scott-continuous. 
Proof. (1) Tps is Scott-continuous, which means the following. 
(i) It is monotonically increasing, i.e. for any ascending chain (Si) we have that 
lJ T,.(S,) G Tp8(LJ S,). This is an easy consequence of the definition. 
(ii) We must now prove that T&J Si) G IJ Tp*(Si). Let gE Tp,(USi). This is 
equivalent to g = C[AO] for some variable-free instance A0 + BIB A . . . A B,o of 
some definite clause A + B, A * * . A B, of P’, and some p-free context C[ ] such 
that C[ B, 01, . . . , C[B,B] E IJ Si. Therefore, 3Zc~ N such that C[B,B], . . . , 
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C[B,B] E Sk, thus g = C[AB] E TP,(S,) E U Tp,(Si)- Whence TP(l_, Si) E lJ TP(Si). 
(2) We now show that ~~nic,O is Scott-continuous. Clearly, it is monotonically 
increasing, i.e. l_J Tionic,o(Si) G ~o”ic,o(U S,). Thus we have to show that 
Tonic,o(U SiJ s U Tonic,o(Si)- We have (g E Tonic,o(U Si)) e g E Ekm or g = c[ 1 
for some context C[ ] and some variable-free instance A8 + B, 0 A . . . A B,B of 
some definite clause A + B, A. . . A B, of scope( C[ 1) such that C[B,B], . . . , 
C[B,B] E IJ Si. We now have two cases: 
l g E Elem + g E 7;,“i,,“(Si) for every i; 
l gGElem+3ksuchthatC[B,O],..., C[B,O]E Sk,thusg= C[AB]E 7;onic,O(Sk) G 
U Toniqo(Si). Whence To&U Sg) s U Toniqo(Si). 
(3) We now show that ~~nic.2 is Scott-continuous. By the same argument as above, 
it is monotonically increasing, i.e. U Tonic,Z(S;) L 7;,ni&J S,). We have to show 
that Tonic.s(U S) G U Tonic,2(Si). We have (g E Tonic,z(U S)) @ 
(i) g E Elem, or 
(ii) g = C[ ] for some context C[ ] and some variable-free instance A8 + B, 0 A 
* * * A B,B of some definite clause A+ B, A. . . A B, of scope(C[ 1) such that 
c[B,~l, . . . , c[B,e] E: U S,, or 
(iii) g = C[(a(i, X), (9,) . . . , CC?,,, (4i Y), ghh . . .)&I where n 3 0, and 
c[(dJ, Q1 u. . . u Qn), (Qi, . . . , (Qn, g),), . . .)J E l_, Si is elementary up to the 
occurrence of [ 1, and where C[ ] is a p-free context, i #j, and X, Y are any logic 
programs. 
The first two cases are handled as for the other components of T above. In the 
third case, we have that 
C[(dj, 91 U. * ’ U Qn), (QI, .. . , (Qn, g)o)o. .)*I E U si 
implies that 3k such that 
therefore g E ~~nic,Z (sk) z Tonic,Z(U ssl C U Tonic,ZCSi). 
Whence the continuity of T(P). 0 
4.2. Derivations: operational semantics of recursive logic program schemes 
We now consider derivation steps on ions. In this section we are interested in 
goal ions of the form ((2, P), g). Each derivation step will be of one of the following 
forms: either a procedure rewriting step or an ion rewriting step, depending on whether 
it rewrites a procedure call or is linked with an ionic operator. As we are in the 
context of a single rewriting system, procedure rewriting steps apply in every 
situation, whereas ion rewriting steps apply only if we are in the right ionic context: 
different ions (in the sense that they are made with different ionic operators) will 
have different rewriting steps. 
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4.2.1. Procedure rewriting steps 
A procedure rewriting step is defined by g + g’ if and only if P -+I P’ is a derivation 
step in grammar 2 for some program P occurring in g, and g’ is obtained from g 
by replacing P by P’. More formally, Vnr-context c[ I,, 
c[P],+c[P’],’ 
4.2.2. Ion rewriting steps 
For ion rewriting steps, as we have done above for the T transformation, we shall 
restrict ourselves to the case where there are only two ionic operators, namely those 
that yield open ions, and ions of the form (a( i, X), g)2. 
Simplification steps. A simpli$cation step (or resolution step) is defined by g + g’ if 
and only if there exists a triple (A, r, 6) where h is a canonical occurrence of an ion 
in g, r is a rule variant A + B, A . . . A B, from the set of definite clauses scope( A, g) u P 
with no variable in common with g, and 0 is a most general unifier for A and the 
ion of occurrence A in g. Goal g’ is then obtained from goal g by simply replacing 
the ion of occurrence A in g by B,tl A. . . A B,O, and applying substitution 0 to the 
rest of ion g. 
In other words, we have VL-context c[ IL: 
a +(*,r-@) B, (j /.) . . . A B,O in the context of P u 
Type-2 ion rewrite rule. For the ions of type-2, we shall also use the following ion 
rewriting rule: For any o-free b-context C[ I,, if the canonical occurrence of 
(w(j, Ye), g)* in 
is u-reducible, and i #j, then 
C[(di, XL (Q1,. . . , (CL (dj, ~21, gM0. . -hM 
+ C[(dj, Q1 u . . . u OnI, (Q,, . . . , (Qn, gM0. . .M21r 
(As was explained earlier, the intuition behind this rule is to formalize the 
reasoning of an agent trying to reconstitute what another agent would conclude 
under a given set of circumstances.) 
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A finite derivation from g is defined as a finite sequence A = g,, 6,) g, , . . . , &,, g, 
such that 
(I) go=g, 
(2) 6, is either an ion rewriting step or a procedure rewriting step from g,_, for 
every i=l,...,n, 
(3) gi = &(g,_,) for every i = 1,. . ., n. 
A finite derivation is successful iff it reaches an empty ion. A derivation is ground 
iff all its ions are ground. 
Lemma 4.2. For any ground ion C[g, A . . . A g,,,], C[g, A . . * A gm] is successful zfand 
only if C[gi] is successful for all i = 1, . . . , m. 
Proof. This is simply obtained by “tracking the residuals” because all derivations 
are ground, and also 
tt-,ttA*..Att. 
\ , 
m times 
Lemma 4.3. For any L-term g, we have: g E lfp( T(E, P)) + ((2, P), g) is the root of 
a successful derivation. 
Proof. We have that 
g E lfp( T(& P)) = U T(-T P)“(0) * 3n. g E 73-7 P)“(0). 
n 
The proof will be by induction on n. 
(1) n = 1 implies g E T(E, P)(0), i.e. 
g E TP(O) u TOnic,o(0) u ‘&onic,z(P)) u Hem 
where P’ is the least solution of logic program scheme (2, P) given by Theorem 
3.6, i.e. P’= [lfp(e)/g]P. Thus we have four cases: 
(a) g E Elem implies g is always successful. 
(b) g E TP(0), where P’ is the r-term computed by logic program scheme (Z, P.). 
Then g = C[AO] and A0 is a ground instance of a unit clause (A+) of P’ and 
C[ tt] E Elem. To obtain a successful derivation, notice that unit clause (A + ) will 
eventually be generated from the initial rr-term P after finitely many procedure call 
steps. Whence a successful derivation from g. 
(c) g E ~~“i,o(0) implies that g = C[AO], where A0 is a ground instance of some 
unit clause of scope([ 1, C[ 1) Whence g is successful. 
(d) g E 7;onic,2(0) implies that g = C[AO], where A0 is a ground instance of some 
unit clause of scope([ 1, C[ 1) and thus g is successful. 
In each one of these cases g is successful. 
(2) Let us assume that the lemma holds for some value n - 1, and let us prove it 
for n. For the sake of keeping a shorter notation, we shall abbreviate T(X’, P) as T. 
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We have that 
g E T(I, p)“(0) = TP’( Tnpl(0)) U Tonic,O( T”-‘(0)) u Tonic,2( T”-‘(0))- 
Again we have four cases: 
(a) g E TP.( T”-‘(0)) implies that g = C[AB], (A + B1 A * * * A B,) E P’, and 
C[B,~l,. . ., C[B,B] E T”-‘(0) for some ground substitution 8. By induction, each 
oneof C[B,B], . . . , C[ B,8] is successful. Therefore the goal C[ B, 61 A * * * A C[ B,B] 
is successful since the successful derivations from C[B,B], . . . , C[ B,O] are all 
ground. Now we call upon Lemma 4.2, and obtain a successful derivation from 
C[&oA.-. A B,O]. Whence in this case g is successful. 
(b) g E ~~nic,O( T”-‘(0) implies that g = C[AB], (A+- B, A. . . A B,) E scope(C[ I), 
and C[B, O], . . . , C[B,8] E T”_‘(0) for some ground substitution 8. By induction, 
each one of C[B,B], . . . , C[B,O] is successful. By the same argument as in the 
previous case, g is successful. 
(c) Assume that g E ~~nic,2( T”-‘(e)). Then we have two cases: 
First case : g = C[AO], (A+ B, A. . . A J?,) E scope(C[ I), and C[B,B], . . . , 
C[B,B] E 7+‘(B), for some ground substitution 8. By induction, each one of 
C[B,e], . . . , C[B,B] is successful. By the same argument as in the previous cases, 
g is successful. 
Second case: C[(q(i, X), (Q,. . . , (Q,,, (o(j, Y), g)&. . .)&I where i#j, and 
C[ ] is a a-free context, with C[(w(j, Q1 u. . . u Q,,), (Q,, . . . , (Qn, g),), . . .)J E 
T”-‘(0). By induction, the latter ion is successful. The fact that C[ ] is o-free means 
that (C[ ]&A) = [ 1, and i2& A, i.e. i2 does not occur in the path from the root of 
C[ ] until [ 1. The canonical occurrence of (o(j, Y), g’)2 in (o( i, X), 
CO,,.. . , (Q,,, (a(j, Y), g),), . . .)o)2 is equal to i,liOl . . . iOl = j.~, where p contains 
one single occurrence of i2 and n occurrences of iO. Now occurrence Ap is u- 
reducible; therefore, since C[ ] is u-free, the type-2 ion rewrite rule applies, i.e. 
we have the rewriting step: 
C[(a(i, rr), (Q1,. . . , (Q,,, (dj, ~21, gLh. . .hML 
+ C[(dj, 9, u. . . u Qn), (QI, (. . . , (On, ghh.. .MA 
which, since the second ion is successful, implies that g itself is successful. 
Whence the lemma. 0 
Lemma 4.4. For any ground L-term g, we have: ((2, P), g) is the root of a successful 
derivation 3 g E lfp( T(_E, P)). 
Proof. By induction on the length of the successful derivation. 
(1) Assume n = 1. 
(a) If the derivation consists of a single procedure call step, then certainly g E Elem 
is an empty ion. 
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(b) If the derivation consists of a simplification step, then g is of the form 
g = C[AO] with (A+ ) E Pu scope(C[ I). Therefore 
g = C[Ael E C[ T(scope(C[ 1)(0)1 G T,,(0) ” Toniqo(0) E lfp( U4 PI). 
(2) Assume the lemma is true for n - 1. Is it true for n? Assume we have a 
successful derivation: 
((-7 P), g)+((& Pl), g,)+. . .+((-T Pn),gn) 
where g, E Elem. We have several cases to consider. 
First case: ((I;, P), g) + ((& PI), g,) is a procedure call step. Then, since T(Z, P) = 
T(LY, P,) and g = g,, we have g E lfp( T(E, P,)) = lfp( T(& P)) 
Second case: ((2, P), g) + ((2, PI), g,) is a simplification step. Then P = P,, g = 
C[A6], g, = C[B,O A. . . A B,O] for some definite clause A+ B, A + * * A B, E 
scope([ 1, C[ 1) u P We now use Lemma 4.2: 
((2, p), C[& f? A . . . A B,O]) is successful 
* Vi((E, P), C[B,O]) is successful 
Whence, by the induction hypothesis, we have that ((1, P), C[ l&O]) E lfp( T(E, P)) 
for every i = 1, . . . , m. By construction of T(& P) this implies C[B, 0 A . . . A B,B] E 
lfp( T(E, P)). Therefore C[AO] E lfp( T(E, P)) by definition of T(E, P). 
Third case: ((Z; P), g)+ ((Z; PI), g,), 8,) IS a type-2 step. In this case, we have 
g = C[(p(I’, r,), (Q1, . . . 9 (On, (di YJ, 8MO~ . .hM‘ 
+ a(& a ” . . . ” Qn), (QI 3 (. . . 2 (Qm, 8hJ”. . .)“)*I‘ 
for some a-free context C[ 1‘. Now since the right-hand side of this step is in 
Ifp( T(X, P)) by the induction hypothesis, then the left-hand side should also be in 
lfp( T(X‘, P)) because of the definition of ~~nic.2. 
Whence the lemma. 0 
We now can deduce the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.5. For any ground L-term g, g is an element of lfp( T(I, P)) if and only if 
((I, P), g) is the root of a successful derivation. 
The rules for ion rewriting steps given in Section 4.2.2 lead to the following sketch 
of an amended version of the Demo “predicate” of [2,8]. notice that the “solve” 
predicate is written in the sole metalanguage. The quote (‘) is used as a naming 
operator. Our system is more powerful than the one of [2,8] however, since we also 
have recursive logic procedures. 
solve(goa1) + is_empty_ion(goal) 
solve(goa1) + occurrence(goa1, ‘h, ‘g) A scope(‘A, goal, ‘Q) A member(clause, ‘Q) 
A rename( clause, goal, clause*) A parts( clause*, conclusion, conditions) 
A match(conclusion, ‘g, substitution) 
A upply([ conditions/‘A]‘g, substitution, newgoal) A solve( newgoal) 
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soW’(di, rd, (Q1, . . . , (On, ((+(i YJ, g&. . .hM 
+ occurrence(‘(d.L ~21, gL, ‘A, ‘Cd& rl), (Q1, . . . , (On, ((+(_k 74, gM0.. -hM 
A (i #j) A a_reducibZe(‘A) 
A solve(‘(4.L 9, u. . . u CL), (Q1, (. . . , (On, ghh. . .hM 
scw([ I, go4 ‘0) 
scope([resf~Axy.(x,y)om],goaZ,‘Q)~((goafJ.rest)=‘(R, a, A*. ‘A a, A’. .Au,),) 
A scope( rest, goal, ‘s) A (Q = R u s) 
sCOpe([restIAXy.(X, y)zT?l], gOUl, ‘~)+((gOU/&WSt) =‘(o, U, A * * * A U,,, A. . . A a,),) 
A does_not_occur_in(Axy.(x, Y)~, rest) 
In our notation [restlu b] for a list, rest denotes all the elements of the list but 
the last two elements, b is the last element of the list, and a’ is the element before 
last. In this logic program, [ ] stands for the empty list, which names the empty 
occurrence. 
5. Example: the three wise men puzzle 
We shall analyze our solution to the three wise men problem into three com- 
ponents: the world as an omniscient demon (e.g. the king) would know it, the 
description of the world, and the three wise men. The wise men have no full access 
to the world itself, but they try to draw conclusions about it by using the current 
description. We shall use the two ionic operators: Axy.(x, Y)~ and Axy.(x, Y)~. If S, 
stands for the logic program corresponding to the i-th wise man, then ion 
(S,, (S,, l(S,, g)2)2)2 will stand for: “The third wise man knows that the second 
wise man knows that the first wise man does not know g.” 
5.1. The world 
It is defined by the distribution of hats set by the king: all hats are white. This 
yields the logic program: 
All ={color(hutl, white)+; coZor(hut2, white)+; coZor(hut3, white)+}. 
5.2. The three wise men 
The three wise men in this puzzle are interchangeable, and can be expressed by 
a single procedure u [8,9]. In this procedure, number i identifies the current wise 
man Si, the higher-order predicate Ax.is_world(x) expresses the world y wise man 
Si is reasoning about, and procedure variable 5 denotes the description of the world 
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used by Si. 
u = ViVy. 
{ idontknow + lcolor( hati, white) A lcoZor( hati, black) 
cansee( hatj) + i # j 
is_ world ( y) + 
,“+ 
5.3. 7’he description of the world 
The following nondeterministic equation gives a diachronic description of the 
information about the world shared by all three agents Si at a given time; [= 
{Qr, Q2, Od. where 
Q, = { color( hut, white) + ({coZor( hut, black) + }, ~f)~ A f 
coZor(hat, white) + ({coZor(hat, black)+}, f)” A If 
color( hut, black) + ({ color( hat, white) + }, ~f)~ A f 
coZor(hat, black) + ({color(hat, white) +}, f)O A If 
color(hat, x)+ cansee(hat) A is-world(Z) A (2, coZor(hat, x)) 
l( color( hatl, black) A color( hat2, black) A color( hat3, black)) + 
1, 
QZ = 9, u {([Q1/51dL AW, idontknow) + I, 
G= Qzu {([Q2/51d2,AW, idontknow)+-l. 
The values Q2 and Q3 are obtained by updating the value of Q with the answers 
of the first and second wise men. This nondeterministic equation, together with the 
definition of u given above, defines the rewriting system 2 we associate with the 
three wise men puzzle. However, to simplify the exposition, we shall restrict ourselves 
to the point of view of the third wise man, and let 
P = ~(3, All;) = { idontknow + lcoZor( hati, white) A lcolor( hati, black) 
cansee( hatj) t i #j 
is_world(All) + 
5+ 
and 
All = {coZor(hatl, white) + 
color( hat2, white) + 
color( hat3, white) +- 
We shall also use the following ion rewrite rule for commuting negation with ionic 
operator i,: 
l(Sk, idontknow),+ (S,, lidontknow), 
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This rule is very specific to our puzzle, since it means that wise man S, does not 
say that he does not know the color of his hat if and only if he indeed knows that 
color. 
5.4. The derivation 
From the point of view of the third wise man, the logic program scheme to be 
considered is (I, ~(3, AZZ)), and the goal clause is + ((2, a(3, All)), coZor(hut3, x))~. 
Starting from this goal clause, we then have the following derivation, which computes 
the answer of the third wise man, where S, = ~(3, AZZ), and S; = [@/5]~(3, AZZ). 
(0) + (S,, coZor( hut3, white)), 
(1) + (S;, coZor(hut3, white)), 
(2) +(s;, ({cozor(hut3, black)+}, l&A& 
(3) +- (S;, ((coZor(hut3, black)+}, l(S,, idontknow),),), 
(4) + (S;, ((coZor(hut3, black) t}, (S,, lidontknow),),), 
(5) +([Q,/[]u(l, (coZor(hut3, black)+}), ((coZor(hut3, black)+}, 
lidontknow),), 
(6) +([Q1/~]a(l,{coZor(hut3, black)+}), ((coZor(hut3, black)+}, 
coZor( hurl, white)),), 
(7) +([Q1/.$]n(l,{coZor(hut3, black)+}), ((coZor(hut3, black)+}, 
((coZor(hut1, black)+-}, ~f’)~~f’)& 
(8) +([Qr/[]a(l, (coZor(hut3, bZuck)+}), ((coZor(hut3, black)+}, 
((coZor(hut1, black)+}, 1([Q2/5]42, AZZ), idontknow),),),), 
(9) +([Q,/t]a(l, (coZor(hut3, bZuck)+}), ((coZor(hut3, black)+}, 
((coZor(hut1, black) +}, ([Q2/5]a(2, All), lidontknow),),),), 
(10) +([QJ[]u(2,{coZor(hut3, black)+-; coZor(hut1, black)+}), 
((coZor(hut3, black) +}, ((coZor(hut1, black) +}, lidontknow),),), 
(11) +([QJ[]~(2,{coZor(hut3, black)+; coZor(hut1, black)+}), 
((coZor(hut3, black) t}, 
((coZor(hut1, black)+}, coZor(hut2, white)),),), 
(12) +([QJ[]a(2,{coZor(hut3, black)+; coZor(hut1, black)+-}), 
((coZor(hut3, black) +}, 
((coZor(hut1, black) +}, ((coZor(hut2, black) c},~“)~A lf”)O),,)2 
(13) + ([&/5]a(2, (coZor(hut3, black)+; coZor(hut1, black)+}), 
({ coZor( hut3, black) t }, 
((coZor(hut1, black)+}, ((coZor(hut2, black)+}, 
coZor( hutl, black) A coZor( hut2, black) A coZor( hut3, bZuck)),),),), 
(14) +([QJe]o(2, (coZor(hut3, black)+; coZor(hut1, black)+-}), 
((coZor(hut3, black) t}, 
((coZor(hut1, black) +}, ((coZor(hut2, black) t}, )&,),& 
This derivation yields an empty ion, thus it is successful, and the third wise man 
will answer that he has a white hat. The ion rewriting rule given above for Axv.(x, Y)~ 
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was used in steps (5) and (10) of this derivation. The reader may check that the 
occurrences rewritten were both u-reducible. It is important to notice in this 
derivation that the value of (S,, ~idontknow) in step (4) is not referentially trans- 
parent; it depends on the context where it occurs. 
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